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Abstract. This paper examines the access control requirements of dis-
tributed health care information networks. Since the electronic sharing
of an individual’s personal health information requires their informed
consent, health care information networks need an access control frame-
work that can capture and enforce individual access policies tailored to
the specific circumstances of each consumer. Role Based Access Control
(RBAC) is examined as a candidate access control framework. While
it is well suited to the task in many regards, we identify a number of
shortcomings, particularly in the range of access policy expression types
that it can support. For efficiency and comprehensibility, access policies
that grant access to a broad range of entities whilst explicitly denying
it to subgroups of those entities need to be supported in health infor-
mation networks. We argue that RBAC does not support policies of this
type with sufficient flexibility and propose a novel adaptation of RBAC
principles to address this shortcoming. We also describe a prototype dis-
tributed medical information system that embodies the improved RBAC
model.
1 Introduction
A fundamental concept underpinning the delivery of health care services is the
notion that personal information shared with a clinician in the context of treat-
ment is confidential. This means that the clinician must have the consent of the
consumer to share information about the consumer with a third party3. In prac-
tice, it is becoming far more challenging to ensure that all confidential health
information disclosures have been consented to, particularly as health service
providers adopt electronic systems based on internet technologies to facilitate
? This research was funded and supported by the Commonwealth of Australia - De-
partment of Health and Ageing.
3 In practice there are a number of important exceptions to the requirement for express
consent, e.g., consent can be implied by circumstances or deemed unnecessary by
legislation. For more information on consent requirements in health care see [4, 5].
information exchange. Electronic health information networks4 and electronic
health records improve the ability of service providers to exchange personal
health information and coordinate service delivery between clinical teams that
cross organisational and geographic boundaries. As a direct consequence, an in-
dividual’s personal health information is potentially available to larger numbers
of people, significantly increasing the risk that the information will be accessed
for purposes for which the consumer has not given their consent. A key challenge
that attends the adoption of electronic health information networks is therefore
to ensure that the principle of consent is meaningfully respected and enforced
in electronic contexts. To achieve this a health information network needs to be
capable of recording and enforcing individual access policies where the consumer
defines the policy details.
1.1 Privacy in Health Care
Unauthorised disclosure of health information can have serious consequences
including refusal of prospective employment, difficulties in obtaining or contin-
uing insurance contracts and loans, ostracisation from family and community
groups and personal embarrassment [15]. Once information has been disclosed,
the damage cannot be undone so, to earn consumer trust it is important that
unauthorised disclosure is prevented, not merely detected after the fact through
audit processes. Broad consumer support for electronic health records will be
predicated on a justifiable and well founded trust that the system will protect
their highly sensitive health information in accordance with the consent that
they are entitled to give or withhold. This includes accommodating the needs of
consumers with especially demanding privacy requirements, e.g. persons receiv-
ing treatment for sensitive conditions (HIV/AIDS, addiction, psychiatric illness
etc.), health care professionals receiving treatment and celebrities. If health in-
formation networks are to be adopted and supported by consumers, their privacy
concerns must be addressed.
1.2 Overview of the Paper
Section 2 examines access control requirements in distributed health care in-
formation systems, focusing on the types of access policy expression that need
to be supported. Section 3 describes the basic concepts underlying Role Based
Access Control (RBAC) and highlights why it is well suited for health care in-
formation systems. Section 4 reviews related work. In Section 5 a shortcoming
of RBAC is presented that limits its ability to support the required types of
4 An electronic health information network aims to connect a broad range of or-
ganisations involved in delivering health related services. The network is used
to collect, store and exchange personal health information. Examples include
the national HealthConnect network currently under development in Australia
(http://www.health.gov.au/healthconnect/)and the National Health Service
Network in the United Kingdom (http://www.nhsia.nhs.uk/).
access policy expression that are discussed in Section 2. A novel modification to
RBAC is introduced in Section 6 that addresses the identified problems. Section
7 describes a prototype distributed medical information system based on the
proposed access control framework.
2 Access Policy Requirements for Health Care
In consent-based information sharing, consumers themselves are able to define
the policies that control third party access to their personal health information.
This represents a significant departure from the traditional approach where or-
ganisations established the access policy. The change is necessary because health
care organisations are internetworking their systems, increasing the potential
for unauthorised access. Since there is a myriad of individual scenarios, circum-
stances and relationships, the access control framework must be flexible and
highly expressive, to ensure that a consumer’s access policy can be recorded
and enforced in a manner that mirrors their understanding of who they want to
have access and who they don’t want to have access. This will typically involve
granting qualified consent to groups or roles, e.g. access is allowed for General
Practitioners except Dr X, who is the consumer’s father in law. To achieve these
goals efficiently, the access control framework needs to support policy expressions
of the following form [4, 5]:
– a broadly expressed or general consent (possibly) qualified by one or more
explicit denials e.g., all clinicians except Doctor X; and,
– a broadly expressed or general denial (possibly) qualified by one or more
explicit consents e.g., no clinician except Doctor X.
Expressions formulated as general denial with explicit consent are required
when the consumer wants access to be tightly restricted e.g., for information
relating to sensitive conditions. In such cases, it will be more efficient to explicitly
name the individuals or groups to be granted access rather than listing those
that should not.
Support for expressions of the alternate form, general consent qualified by ex-
plicit denial are particularly important for efficiency and comprehensibility. To
minimise system management effort, individual access policies will commonly be
based on defaults appropriate to the clinical context that reflect acceptable cur-
rent practice. This default policy will be expressed as a broadly expressed consent
that grants access to appropriate roles. Individual consumers may wish to mod-
ify this default consent with a qualification that removes access from particular
groups or named individuals, in recognition of their specific circumstances.
Explicit denial is also necessary to ensure that a consumer’s access policy
is reliably enforced over time (where that policy involves denying access). Since
explicit denial is more than just the absence of a positive access right it must
be removed for it to be overridden. To illustrate the importance of this feature,
consider a scenario where a consumer wishes to exclude a particular Doctor, (Dr
X) from access to their records. The consumer has also given consent for Doctors
at Acme Clinic to access their records. If Doctor X subsequently comes to work
at Acme Clinic, explicit denial ensures that he will not be given access to the
consumer’s records despite the fact that he holds the role of Doctor at Acme
Clinic, to which consent has been granted.
To construct complex policy expressions with a minimum number of state-
ments, and support the qualification of default policies to meet individual needs,
the nesting of different expression types is desirable. Within a hierarchy of clini-
cal roles, nesting would allow access policy statements such as: allow all clinicians
(general consent), except for nurses (explicit denial), except for nurses at Acme
Clinic (explicit consent), except for the nurse Alice at Acme Clinic who is the
consumer’s mother in law (explicit denial). We believe that policy expressions of
this form are a practical requirement for efficient and manageable consent-based
health information sharing.
3 An Overview of Role Based Access Control
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is a mechanism for access control that de-
couples users from privileges by the inter-positioning of roles [8, 9, 11]. Users are
assigned to roles and roles are authorised to access objects with privileges. This
decoupling lends a greater degree of scalability to systems in which access must
be regulated. A role can reflect the responsibilities of a position or job description
in the context of an organization e.g. Doctor or Nurse. When an individual is
assigned the responsibility to perform a particular job, a security administrator
puts them in the appropriate role. They can exercise the privileges associated
with the role because they are recognised as holding the role.
Unlike traditional Access Control List (ACL) based approaches, RBAC does
not allow users to be directly associated with privileges as all privileges are held
by roles. This layer of indirection between users and privileges that is introduced
by the concept of roles is a defining feature of RBAC. It is the primary distinction
that motivates the common claim that RBAC is more manageable than ACL
based approaches in large scale systems with many users.
The primary motivation for RBAC lies in reducing the complexity and effort
required to manage authorisation data in large scale systems [8]. It has been
designed for environments where Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is inap-
propriate because end users do not own the information they are allowed to
access and therefore should not have the discretion to grant access to others.
It is particularly well suited to environments where access rights are based on
competency or recognition of a professional qualification. Since this describes key
aspects of the health care environment, it is hardly surprising that role-based
approaches have found considerable support in health care settings [1, 3, 6].
Roles facilitate efficient assignment and removal of privileges and impor-
tantly, analysis of privilege authorisation to users. Role/privilege associations
typically change less frequently than user/privilege associations because work
flow processes, (which define the set of privileges required by a role) are relatively
stable whereas user/task assignments are not - individual user’s job responsibili-
ties change as they move between departments, change jobs etc. [7]. RBAC severs
the user/privilege association through the interpositioning of roles, resulting in
reduced management overhead. User membership of roles can be easily granted
or revoked, thereby conferring or removing a potentially rich set of privileges in
one simple step.
In systems implementing RBAC, the consistency of privilege allocation, (who
can access what) can be audited efficiently, thereby reducing undetected config-
uration errors, a key advantage in the highly distributed environments encoun-
tered in health care. This is a key difference to traditional ACL based approaches
utilising groups. Groups bring together users but they do not bring together priv-
ileges as roles do. This makes the analysis of privilege assignments difficult in
ACL based systems since every object must be examined to ascertain the privi-
leges of a user or group. In RBAC systems, only the roles need to be reviewed as
all privileges are held through their assignment to roles. This distinction has an
important consequence in terms of the ease with which a consumer can change
or revoke their consent for information disclosure. When all privileges are held
through roles, this is a significantly easier operation as privileges are centralised.
RBAC systems adhere to the principle of general denial with explicit consent.
Only users that are assigned to roles are permitted to access objects for which the
roles have positive privileges. Through static constraints, users can be prevented
from joining roles for which they are not qualified (prerequisite constraints) or
combinations of roles that are inappropriate (static separation of duty) [11].
Where selective role activation is permitted, dynamic constraints allow users to
belong to multiple roles but enforce that only a subset of those roles may be
active at a time (dynamic separation of duty) [16].
The use of inheritance allows roles to implicitly acquire the privileges and
constraints of roles beneath them in the inheritance hierarchy. For the sake of
consistency, it is usually not appropriate to impose constraints upon roles within
the same path (from root to leaf) on a hierarchy (for example, a member of a role
is automatically the member of its descendant, so a static constraint forbidding
joint membership of both does not permit consistency). In Section 5 we argue
that as a result of the inheritance of constraints, RBAC does not efficiently sup-
port access policy statements in the form of general consent qualified by explicit
denial or the nesting of explicit denials and consents that successively qualify
each other in a role hierarchy. Policy expressions of this form are a practical
requirement for consent based health information sharing.
4 Related Work
4.1 RBAC in Health Care
RBAC has received considerable attention in the context of health care, partic-
ularly in the hospital environment, e.g. [3, 6, 14]. However, the practical implica-
tions of implementing access policies based on individual consumer consent are
not directly addressed. Access policies are determined at an organisational or
departmental level and the ability to support individual exceptions to default
policies is not a supported feature.
The OASIS project [12] has examined the application of RBAC principles
to distributed health care information networks. In [1] the authors recognise
that the standard RBAC framework is not suitable when individual exceptions
to default access policies need to be supported. Their approach to addressing
this problem involves storing exceptions to the default policy with the affected
records themselves. This is not entirely consistent with the role based approach
which stipulates that all permissions are held by roles, (since the exceptions are
effectively negative permissions). Our proposal differs in that it enables individ-
ually tailored policies that are based on defaults through the ability to explicitly
grant and deny authorisation for a set of privileges, (a consumer-centric role)
without resorting to storing overriding access policy with records, an approach
which we believe violates the simplicity of the role based metaphor. Since all ac-
cess policy remains centrally located in the role definition, update or revocation
of consent (e.g. when an consumer’s circumstances change) can be carried out
more easily.
In [13] the authors describe an authorisation model developed for the dis-
tributed health care environment of the U.K. National Health Service. Access
privileges can be both granted and denied through the use of positive or neg-
ative confidentiality permissions. The model describes four different confiden-
tiality permission types that have a fixed hierarchical precedence. Higher order
confidentiality permissions types can override lower order types. The model ad-
dresses similar issues to our proposal. However our model differs in that negation
of the privilege set of a role can be effected for any other role(s) within a role
hierarchy rather than being limited to using four fixed precedence confidentiality
permissions types. We believe this produces a more general and flexible solution.
4.2 Negative Privileges and Explicit Denial of Authorisation
The RBAC model that NIST has proposed for standardisation does not support
explicit denial except in a limited way through the use of constraints [10].
Packet filtering firewalls implement positive and negative authorisation through
allow and deny rules where the ordering of the rules is crucial. Since the order
determines the effect of the rules, firewall rule sets can be notoriously difficult to
to configure and comprehend [2]. In our modified RBAC proposal, the role hier-
archy effectively determines the rule order so misconfiguration due to incorrect
ordering is not possible.
4.3 Contribution
The main contribution of this work is to propose a modified RBAC model in
which a set of privileges held by a role can be allowed or denied to other roles
without using traditional RBAC constraints concepts such as static and dynamic
separation of duty. While this necessitates a more complex authorisation algo-
rithm, the model allows highly flexible policy expressions and supports policies
that can be based on defaults for efficiency but can be qualified to implement
individual exceptions, a key requirement for health care information systems.
5 Implementing Explicit Denial in RBAC
RBAC does not efficiently support policy expressions in the form of a broadly
expressed consent qualified by explicit denials since it implements a model where
anything that is not explicitly allowed is implicitly denied. The mechanism of
constraints is used in standard RBAC to deny the exercising of the privileges
of a role that would otherwise be allowed. However, constraints do not provide
an elegant solution when nesting of the policy expression types is required. This
is due to the fact that constraints are also inherited in a role-based hierarchy
supporting inheritance. Since an inherited role is also an instance of its parent
role, i.e. a nurse is a clinician, constraints applying to clinician must also apply
to nurse for them to be consistently applied.
Consider the the example access policy from Section 2. A static constraint
that denied the nurses role will not be effective in implementing the policy be-
cause the role of nurses at Acme Clinic inherits the role of nurse, so it also
inherits the constraint. As a consequence, nurses at Acme Clinic would be de-
nied. There is no way to turn the constraint off for roles higher up the hierarchy
on the same path, whilst maintaining consistency.
6 The Proposed Model
In our proposed health care model and prototype implementation an individual’s
access policy and the personal information it relates to are recorded and enforced
through a consumer-centric role that we will refer to as a care team role5. Figure
1 illustrates the important components of a care team role. Authorisation (who
can activate the role and exercise its privileges) for a care team role is determined
by the contents of the role’s allowed and denied lists. These two lists contain roles
drawn from the affiliation and competency role hierarchies (discussed in Section
6.1). Specifically denied roles override equal or more general roles (i.e., equivalent
or lower in a hierarchy) in the allowed list. This permits nested expressions as
in the example given in Section 2. Figure 1 shows the allowed and denied roles
that implement the example policy.
The support for nested expressions allows complex consents to be expressed
in an intuitive and efficient way, without sacrificing the granularity of that ex-
pression. Denying access to an exception, (e.g. all clinicians except nurses) is
5 The description care team role is used since the role defines the entities that will have
access to the individual’s records. Entities requiring access are generally involved in
the consumer’s care and are therefore part of a care team for the consumer. Care team
roles are always associated with a single consumer. A consumer will have multiple
care team roles if subsets of their health information require different access policies.
A care team role controls access to the records whose identifiers are listed in the
permission set of the role.
more efficient than explicitly naming all the clinical roles that are not nurses. It
also mirrors the way that people think about access policies, i.e, they commonly
know who they want to exclude or include.
Care Team Role
Consent Denied
Access Permissions Care Team Role Details
All Clinicians
Nurses at Acme Clinic
Consent Allowed
Nurses
Nurse Alice
ID: # 6543.4127.9005
ID: #6453.7634.8188
ID: #0045.5484.1837
Pseudo ID: 3F2AA13C...
Role ID: #4014.5322.900
Desc: Diabetes Care
Fig. 1. Care Team Role - a consumer-centric role
6.1 Role Hierarchies
In our proposed design, a consumer’s consent instructions are expressed by means
of allowing and denying hierarchically related roles that employ a range of differ-
ent classifications and granularity. More generally, the model allows any number
of role hierarchies to be used. Hierarchies with different roots can be joined,
allowing multi-dimensional structures that support complex (multiple) inheri-
tance. The prototype provides a convenient method of expression to identify
entities using two principle role-based hierarchies:
– the clinical competency hierarchy - this hierarchy is used to recognise and
identify registered clinicians. The hierarchy includes a special role for each
individual registered clinician, e.g. Registered Nurse: Barry Roberts. Indi-
vidual roles of the user acting as them self are used to implement explicit
acceptance or denial of individuals. Note that any node in the hierarchy can
be specifically allowed or denied;
– the affiliation hierarchy - this hierarchy allows provider organisations to
recognise individuals as members of clinical (e.g. Psychologist @ Acme Health
Care) and administrative organisational roles.
6.2 Explanation of the Model
In simple terms, our proposed model implements an anti-RBAC that represents
general consent with explicit denial. This anti-RBAC is unified with standard
RBAC which implements general denial with explicit consent via a new autho-
risation algorithm. This permits a flexible and expressive revised model which
retains RBAC’s elegance without the need for constraints.
Figure 2 shows the modified relationship between roles and permissions. A
care team role encapsulates a consent allowed role (from standard RBAC ) and
a consent denied role (from anti-RBAC ). The denied role is associated with a
negative permission and the allowed role is associated with a positive permission.
Care teams are populated, as in the usual way, by inheritance. Each role can
inherit from any number of subsidiary roles, (e.g. Dr X inherits from Doctors)
and each role or its descendants can be associated with either consent allowed
or consent denied.
The example in Figure 2 shows general consent for all Doctors qualified
by explicit denial for Dr X. The user Doctor X assumes the role of the user
acting as them self 6 - i.e. the role Doctor X, as shown in Figure 2, and inherits
permissions from Care Team #6667 Consent Denied. Under normal RBAC rules,
he also inherits the permissions from Care Team #6667 Consent Allowed via
the Doctors role, but the new algorithm states that the first permission inherited
down the path of a hierarchy is the one that takes precedence or sticks. Therefore,
Doctor X is denied.
Care Team #6667
Consent Allowed
Consent Denied
Read
Read
YES
NO
Document
#5671.6341
Doctor X
Clinician
Doctors
Fig. 2. Consent for Doctors qualified by explicit denial of Dr X
Authorisation Algorithm This section presents the authorisation algorithm
for the proposed scheme. Any node in a hierarchy has access rights that are
explicitly allowed, explicitly denied or ambiguous. The case for explicit allowance
or denial is simple - that node is accorded that access role without relying upon
other nodes in the hierarchy.
An ambiguous node inherits permission from its children. If any of its im-
mediate children have explicit denial, then the ambiguity of the node resolves
also to denial. If this is not the case, then ambiguous children must first be re-
solved into either allowance or denial, and any emerging denial also passes to
6 In our proposed health information scheme users always make access requests
through the role of the user acting as them self. This is enforced by the system to
ensure that explicit allowance or denial of individuals cannot be bypassed through
selective role activation.
the ambiguous parent. The ambiguity of the parent translates to allowance only
if none of the children have denial. Ambiguous nodes in the hierarchy can not be
resolved if all of their children (immediate and remote) are also ambiguous. In
this case, the model of implicit denial decrees that ambiguous leaves can resolve
automatically to denial.
This is formalised in the following algorithm, which resolves the access rights
of the role labeled start7
1. Consider role start. Go to step 2.
2. Does this role have explicit denial?
– if yes, then halt algorithm with access denied
– if no, go to step 3.
3. Does this role have explicit allow?
– if yes, then if this role is start, halt algorithm with access allowed
– if yes, but this role is not start
• if no more siblings, go to step 5, otherwise
• resume at step 2 with next sibling and access allowed
– if no, go to step 4.
4. For each child ‘x’ of this role,
– set role to child ‘x’
– go to step 2.
5. Has an access allowed been received?
– if yes and role is start, halt algorithm with access allowed
– if no and role is start, halt algorithm with access denied
– otherwise set role to parent’s next sibling and resume at step 2 with any
received access allowed
An Example of a Nested Allow and Deny Policy Figure 3 illustrates
the example that we introduced in Section 2. Doctors are allowed to access the
document by virtue of the inheritance of Care Team #6667 Consent Allowed
through the clinicians role. Nurses at City Clinic obtain the first permission
through the Nurses role, which happens to be the negative permission associ-
ated with Care Team #6667 Consent Denied. Nurses at Acme Clinic obtain
the positive permission associated with Care Team #6667 Consent Allowed, ex-
cept for the Mother-in-law Nurse, Alice who directly obtains Care Team #6667
Consent Denied.
7 Prototype Implementation
We have developed a prototype distributed health information system that im-
plements the proposed access control model to establish the model’s viability and
practicality. The prototype was successfully tested against a broad set of sample
case scenarios to ensure that access policies reflecting realistic and challenging
situations could be represented and enforced8.
7 In the context of the prototype, the start role is the role of the user acting as them
self i.e., the individualised role of the user requesting access.
8 Details of some of the sample case scenarios that were used to validate the model can
be accessed at http://www.health.gov.au/hsdd/primcare/it/pdf/testcase.pdf.
Care Team #6667
Consent Allowed
Consent Denied
Read
Read
YES
NO
Document
#5671.6341
DoctorsNurses
  Acme
Nurses at
City Clinic
Nurses at
Nurse Alice
at Acme
Clinicians
Fig. 3. Nested consent and denial
7.1 Prototype Architecture
The prototype consists of a directory server, a document server and a client
application. The directory server is a logically centralised LDAP9 directory that
is used by the document server to retrieve information about the roles that
individuals hold and the details of the role hierarchies. While it is logically
centralised, its actual deployment and management can be distributed. This is
important because the data contained in the directory needs to be kept up to
date by different organisations.
Fig. 4. Client Application - configuring access policy in a care team role
9 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is an internet protocol for accessing
directory services.
In the prototype, the document server is responsible for storing and mediat-
ing access to protected health information. Our proposed RBAC access control
logic is implemented in the document server. The design supports retrieval of
individual documents or all the data that a requester is authorised to see for
a particular consumer. All interactions with the document server are authenti-
cated. The client application is used for consent administration, document pub-
lishing and document retrieval. Care team roles are created and modified with
a simple drag and drop interface that allows clinical and organisational roles to
be added to the consent allowed and denied lists. This is illustrated in Figure 4.
The role hierarchies are graphically displayed, with allowed roles in green and
implicitly or explicitly denied roles in red.
Documents are published to the document server by associating care team
roles with the document elements and approving the transfer. The consent al-
lowed and denied lists display as each individual section of a document is se-
lected. This makes it easy for the consumer and clinician to understand how
access will be controlled. Different sections or elements of the same record, mes-
sage, or document, (the data) may have different levels of sensitivity and there-
fore, different consent conditions will be applicable. This is supported in our
design because these different elements can each reference a separate care team
role. This assumes that the underlying data format is structured in a way that
permits the unique identification of data elements, as is the case with medical
record standards such as HL710. This does not imply that HL7 based systems
are a prerequisite for the proposed model. The required structure can be added
to information extracted from legacy systems at the time it is retrieved.
8 Conclusions
Role-based Access Control systems adhere to the principle where anything that
is not explicitly allowed is implicitly denied. In health care, it is often more
efficient and reliable to use the opposite form of expression, where denied access is
explicitly stated. Distributed health information networks require a combination
of both forms of expression to allow the system to implement access policy in
a way that mirrors the way consumers commonly think about who should have
access to their health information. This results in a system that is easier for
clinicians and consumers to understand and manage.
This paper has indentified that standard RBAC models don’t support a pol-
icy expression in the form of a general consent with explicit denial with ade-
quate flexibility for distributed health information networks. We have presented
an adaptation of RBAC that supports general consent with explicit denial. The
proposed model also permits allow and deny policies to successively qualify each
other in a role hierarchy supporting inheritance. This results in an access con-
trol framework that exhibits great flexibility and efficiency in the range of access
policies that it can support. This model has been implemented in a prototype
distributed health information system.
10 http://www.hl7.org/
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